BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10111, David J. Sheehan, Esq., Oren J. Warshavsky, Esq., Jason S. Oliver, Esq., Of Counsel, Attorneys for Plaintiff, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1667 K St., NW, Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20006, Josephine Wang, Esq., General Counsel, Kevin H. Bell, Esq., Senior Associate General Counsel, For Dispute Resolution, Nathanael S. Kelley, Esq., Associate General Counsel, Of Counsel, Attorneys for Securities Investor Protection Corporation, STEVENS & LEE, P.C., 485 Madison Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, New York 10022, Nicholas F. Kajon, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant, Plaintiff Irving H. Picard, as trustee (the "Trustee") for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS") under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. ("SIPA"), commenced this adversary proceeding, inter alia , to avoid and recover intentional fraudulent transfers from the BLMIS account held by Legacy Capital Ltd. ("Legacy") pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a)(1). The Trustee now moves for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Trustee's motion is denied but certain facts are deemed either immaterial or undisputed for the purposes of this adversary proceeding., The Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding on December 6, 2010 and filed an Amended Complaint on July 2, 2015 ("Amended Complaint ") (ECF Doc. # 112) asserting actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims under the Bankruptcy Code and New York law to avoid and recover over $213 million from Legacy as initial transferee and $6.6 million from Khronos LLC as subsequent transferee. (See Amended Complaint , ¶ 2.) Legacy and Khronos each moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See ECF Doc. ## 115, 120.) As set forth in Picard v. Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS ), 548 B.R. 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (" Dismissal Decision "), the Court dismissed the claims against Khronos and dismissed the claims against Legacy except for the actual fraudulent transfer claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) to avoid and recover transfers from Legacy's BLMIS account within two years of the Filing Date. (See Order Granting Legacy Capital Ltd.'s and Khronos LLC's Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) , dated Apr. 12, 2016 (ECF Doc. # 137).) Legacy answered the Amended Complaint on May 16, 2016 ("Answer ") (ECF Doc. # 139)., The Trustee now moves for summary judgment on the remaining claim, (see Trustee's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment , dated Dec. 21, 2018 ("Trustee Brief ") (ECF Doc. # 191)), and Legacy opposes the motion. (See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment , dated Mar. 1, 2019 ("Legacy Brief ") (ECF Doc. # 199).), Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to this adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, governs motions for summary judgment. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine factual issue exists and that the undisputed facts establish its right to judgment as a matter of law. Rodriguez v. City of N.Y. , 72 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1995) ; accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making that determination, a court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). If the movant carries his initial burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The court's function at the summary judgment stage is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but only to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the Court does not grant all the relief sought by the movant, it may nonetheless enter an order stating any material fact, including any item of damages or other relief, not in genuine dispute and treat that fact as established in the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g) ; see 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.123 (3d ed. 2018)., Legacy has admitted that BLMIS transferred $174 million from its BLMIS account within two years of the Filing Date (the "Two-Year Transfers"). (Legacy Capital Ltd.'s Response to Trustee's Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1 , dated Mar. 1, 2019 ("Legacy 7056-1 Statement "), ¶ 35 (ECF Doc. # 199-47); see Amended Complaint , ¶ 37 and Answer , ¶ 37; see also Stipulation and Order as to Undisputed Transfers , dated Jan. 12, 2017 ("Transfers Stipulation "), ¶ 4 ("Exhibit A to this stipulation accurately sets forth the cash deposits and cash withdrawals from the ... BLMIS accounts.") (ECF Doc. # 155).) Legacy argues that the aggregate of $87 million was actually transferred from its BLMIS account to BNP Paribas - Dublin Branch, a registered branch of BNP Paribas S.A. (together, "BNP Paribas") as repayment for a $100 million line of credit. (Amended Complaint , ¶¶ 139, 140; Answer , ¶¶ 139, 140, 142.) It suggests that the Court should ignore these transfers in computing its liability. (Legacy Brief at 16-17.), The argument lacks merit. The payment to BNP Paribas does not affect the amount of the transfers. At most, it makes BNP Paribas rather than Legacy the initial transferee of transfers that are otherwise fraudulent. Liability is not, however, limited to recovery from the initial transferee. A trustee may also recover an avoided fraudulent transfer from the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made, 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1), and any subsequent transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2). Since the transfers made to BNP Paribas satisfied Legacy's obligations to BNP Paribas, Legacy was the entity for whose benefit those transfers were made within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1). See Ames Merch. Corp. v. Nikko Am., Inc. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. ), No. 01-42217 (REG), 2011 WL 1239804, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) ("The 'paradigm' transfer beneficiary is a party ... whose debts are extinguished or reduced by the transfer: that is someone who receives the benefit but not the money.") (footnote, alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)., To prove intent to deceive, the Trustee relies on the "Ponzi scheme presumption" under which the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is presumed if the transferor operated a Ponzi scheme and the transfers are made in furtherance of the Ponzi scheme. See Moran v. Goldfarb , No. 09 Civ. 7667 (RJS), 2012 WL 2930210, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) ("an actual intent to defraud is presumed because the transfers made in the course of a Ponzi scheme could have been made for no purpose other than to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors") (citation, internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd. ), 397 B.R. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("if a transfer serves to further a Ponzi scheme, then the presumption applies and 'actual intent' under § 548(a)(1)(A) is present"); Geltzer v. Barish (In re Starr ), 502 B.R. 760, 770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("In order to apply the Ponzi scheme presumption, the transfers must be made in furtherance of the fraud."); see Christian Bros. High Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Grp., LLC ), 439 B.R. 284, 294, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). "A 'Ponzi scheme' typically describes a pyramid scheme where earlier investors are paid from the investments of more recent investors, rather than from any underlying business concern, until the scheme ceases to attract new investors and the pyramid collapses." Eberhard v. Marcu , 530 F.3d 122, 132 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2008) ; accord Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co. , 72 F.3d 1085, 1088 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting McHale v. Huff (In re Huff ), 109 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) ). The presumption is based on a recognition that a Ponzi scheme operator knows that the scheme will eventually collapse when the pool of investors runs dry and the remaining investors will lose their money. Bayou , 439 B.R. at 306 n. 19 ("Knowledge to a substantial certainty constitutes intent in the eyes of the law, and awareness that some investors will not be paid is sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).