Annmarie Antoniette Chiarello, Rakhee V. Patel, Winstead PC, Dallas, TX, for Debtors., Melina Bales, Jason B. Binford, Holland N. O'Neil, Foley Gardere, Foley & Lardner LLP, Dallas, TX, Paul Richard Bessette, Rebecca T. Matsumura, King & Spalding LLP, Austin, TX, Mark M. Maloney, King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff., Annmarie Antoniette Chiarello, Jason Alexander Enright, Phillip L. Lamberson, Rakhee V. Patel, Winstead PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants., The Arbitration Motion was filed by party Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland"). Highland and a related company, Highland CLO Funding Ltd. ("HCLOF"), were originally the plaintiffs in this Adversary Proceeding, suing the Chapter 11 Trustee for injunctive relief (arguing early during the above-referenced Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that the Chapter 11 Trustee was interfering with their business rights and decisions, essentially). The Chapter 11 Trustee fired back with 35 counterclaims against Highland and HCLOF (adding three parties related to Highland as third-party defendants with regard to some of those 35 counterclaims). Notably, these 35 counterclaims-as directed toward Highland -were also alleged to be objections to Highland's two $ 4,672,140.38 proofs of claim filed in the underlying bankruptcy cases. In that regard, the Chapter 11 Trustee stated that his Answer and Counterclaims included "an objection to Highland Capital's proofs of claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3007(b), and the counterclaims asserted herein shall constitute recoupment and/or offset to such proofs of claim, to the extent such claims are otherwise allowed." In fact, after the 35 counts were articulated in the Chapter 11 Trustee's Answer and Counterclaims, there were 20 paragraphs (¶¶ 252-271, pp. 70-77) solely articulating the Chapter 11 Trustee's objections to Highland's proofs of claim. The Chapter 11 Trustee also filed yet a separate adversary proceeding, Adv. Proc. No. 18-03212, seeking his own injunctive relief, which has recently been consolidated with this Adversary Proceeding., Citing to the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. , Highland argues that the bankruptcy court must enter an order compelling arbitration as to counts 1-8 because: (a) these eight counts revolve around the interpretation of certain prior versions of a Sub-Advisory Agreement and Shared Services Agreement (later defined); and (b) the aforementioned agreements contained binding arbitration clauses. Highland also requests that the Adversary Proceeding be stayed regarding counts 1-8, pending binding arbitration. The Reorganized Debtors dispute that there are binding arbitration clauses applicable to counts 1-8. As explained further below, the aforementioned agreements were amended many times and the arbitration clauses were eventually eliminated in the last versions of the agreements. The Reorganized Debtors also urge that, even if there are applicable arbitration clauses, the court may and should exercise discretion and decline to order arbitration, since core bankruptcy matters are involved and arbitration would conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. For the reasons set forth below, the Arbitration Motion is denied. This means that Counts 1-26 & 33-35 will go forward and be adjudicated in this Adversary Proceeding. But as will be explained in a separate order that is being issued shortly following this order, there are certain counts complaining of postpetition state law torts and breaches of contract in this Adversary Proceeding (Counts 27-32) that this court believes should be separated out into a different adversary proceeding and consolidated with a contested matter involving a Highland request for allowance of a postpetition administrative expense claim [DE # 772]., As this court has noted on various occasions, Acis LP was formed in the year 2011, and is primarily a CLO portfolio manager. Specifically, Acis LP provides fund management services to various special purpose entities that hold CLOs (which is an acronym for "collateralized loan obligations"). Acis LP was providing management services for five such special purpose entities (the "Acis CLOs") as of the time that it and its general partner were put into the above-referenced involuntary bankruptcy cases (the "Bankruptcy Cases"). The parties have informally referred to the special purpose entities themselves as the "CLO Issuers" or "CLO Co-Issuers" but, to be clear, these special purpose entities (hereinafter, the "CLO SPEs") are structured as follows: (a) on the asset side of their balance sheets, the entities own pieces of senior debt owed by large corporations and, therefore, earn revenue from the variable interest payments made by those corporations on such senior debt; and (b) on the liability side of their balance sheets, the entities have obligations in the form of notes (i.e. , tranches of fixed interest rate notes) on which the CLO SPEs themselves are obligated-the holders of which notes are mostly institutions and pension funds. The CLO SPEs make a profit, based on the spread or "delta" between: (a) the variable rates of interest paid on the assets that the CLO SPEs own (i.e. , the basket of senior notes); and (b) the fixed rates of interest that the CLO SPEs must pay on their own tranches of debt. At the bottom of the CLO SPEs' capital structure is their equity (sometimes referred to as "subordinated notes," but these "notes" are genuinely equity). As portfolio manager, Acis LP manages the CLO SPEs' pools of assets (by buying and selling senior loans to hold in the CLO SPEs' portfolios) and communicates with investors in the CLO SPEs. The CLO SPEs' tranches of notes are traded on the Over-the-Counter market., First, Acis LP has various portfolio management agreements ("PMAs") with the CLO SPEs , pursuant to which Acis LP earns management fees. The PMAs have been the primary "assets" (loosely speaking) of Acis LP. They are what generate revenue for Acis LP., Second, Acis LP had a Sub-Advisory Agreement (herein so called) with Highland . Pursuant to this agreement, Acis LP essentially sub-contracted for the use of Highland front-office personnel/advisors to perform management services for Acis LP (i.e. , so that Acis LP could fulfill its obligations to the CLO SPEs under the PMAs). Acis LP paid handsome fees to Highland pursuant to this agreement. This agreement was rejected (with bankruptcy court approval) by the Chapter 11 Trustee during the Bankruptcy Cases, when the Chapter 11 Trustee credibly represented that he had not only found resources to provide these services at a much lower cost to the estate, but he also had begun to believe that Highland was engaging in stealth efforts to liquidate the Acis CLOs, to the detriment of Acis LP's creditors., Third, Acis LP also had a Shared Services Agreement (herein so called) with Highland, pursuant to which Acis LP essentially sub-contracted for the use of Highland's back-office services (again, so that Acis LP could fulfill its obligations to the CLO SPEs under the PMAs). To be clear, Acis LP had no employees of its own-only a couple of officers and members. Acis LP paid handsome fees to Highland for the personnel and back-office services that Highland provided to Acis LP. This agreement was also rejected by the Chapter 11 Trustee during the Bankruptcy Cases (with Bankruptcy Court approval) for the same reasons that the Sub-Advisory Agreement with Highland was rejected., Fourth, until a few weeks before the Bankruptcy Cases were filed, Acis LP also had yet another portfolio management agreement (distinct from its PMAs with the CLO SPEs) whereby Acis LP provided services not just to the CLO SPEs themselves, but separately to the equity holder in the CLO SPEs. This portfolio management agreement with the equity holder in the CLO SPEs is sometimes referred to by the parties as the "ALF PMA," but it would probably be easier to refer to it as the "Equity PMA" (for ease of reference, the court will refer to it as the "Equity/ALF PMA"). Acis LP did not earn a specific fee pursuant to the Equity/ALF PMA, but the Chapter 11 Trustee and others credibly testified during the Bankruptcy Cases that Acis LP considered the agreement valuable and very important, because it essentially gave Acis LP the ability to control the whole Acis CLO eco-system-in other words, it gave Acis LP the ability to make substantial decisions on behalf of the CLO SPEs' equity -distinct from making decisions for the CLO SPEs themselves pursuant to the PMAs. In any event, shortly before the Bankruptcy Cases were filed, agents of Highland and/or others controlling Acis LP: (a) caused Acis LP to terminate this Equity/ALF PMA; and (b) then caused the equity owner to enter into a new Equity PMA with a newly formed offshore entity called Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. (one of the Defendants in this Adversary Proceeding)., The Adversary Proceeding, distilled to its essence-and as currently framed-is all about certain activities of Highland and some of its affiliates and actors who controlled it, which activities were allegedly aimed at denuding Acis LP of all of its value , at a time when the former portfolio manager for Acis LP was on the verge of obtaining a very large judgment claim against Acis LP. Specifically, these activities of Highland began soon after: (a) it terminated former Acis CLO manager Joshua Terry ("Terry") in June 2016; (b) it began litigating with him (which litigation was sent to arbitration) in September 2016; and (c) Terry obtained an approximately $ 8 million arbitration award against Acis LP in October 2017, which was confirmed by a judgment in December 2017. The activities and counts revolve around: (a) Highland's alleged overcharging of Acis LP by more than $ 7 million for fees/expenses under the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreement, as limited by the LPA (Counts 1-4); (b) alleged fraudulent transfers of value out of Acis LP, by virtue of various amendments and modifications of the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreements (Counts 5-8); (c) an alleged fraudulent transfer as to the Equity/ALF PMA (Counts 9-12); (d) an alleged fraudulent transfer pertaining to Acis LP's conveyance away of its so-called ALF Equity (Counts 13-16); (e) an alleged fraudulent transfer of a $ 9.5 million note receivable Acis LP held (Counts 17-20); (f) various other fraudulent transfers (Counts 21-24); (g) preferences (Count 25); (h) assertion of a section 550 recovery remedy for the aforementioned avoidance actions (Count 26); and (i) requests for punitive damages, an alter ego/veil piercing remedy, and attorneys' fees (Counts 33-35). There are also some counts complaining of postpetition state law torts and breaches of contract (Counts 27-32)., As mentioned earlier, Highland's Arbitration Motion only requests the court defer to arbitration Counts 1-8-that is the counts relating to: (a) Highland's alleged overcharging of Acis LP by more than $ 7 million for fees/expenses under the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreement, as perhaps limited by the LPA (Counts 1-4); and (b) the alleged fraudulent transfers of value out of Acis LP, by virtue of various amendments and modifications of the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreements (Counts 5-8). Highland argues that, since all of these counts pertain to the Sub-Advisory Agreement and Shared Services Agreement between Acis LP and Highland, the arbitration clauses in those agreements dictate that the counts be carved out from this Adversary Proceeding and sent to binding arbitration. Highland acknowledges that these two agreements were amended and restated numerous times, and that the last time they were amended (March 17, 2017) the arbitration clauses were eliminated, but Highland argues that, since all of the activity complained of in Counts 1-8 occurred prior to March 17, 2017, the older iterations of the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreements, with arbitration clauses, govern . Highland zeroes in on the fact that Counts 1-4, at their essence, are assertions that the fees for services charged by Highland in the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreements were excessive for the years 2013, 2014, 2015, and through May 2016 (all before the March 17, 2017 iteration of the agreements). And Counts 5-8, while articulated as fraudulent transfer claims, pertain to the modifications made to the Sub-Advisory and Shared Services Agreements at various stages up to the March 17, 2017 versions.