Andrew R Kasle, Beachwood, OH, for Plaintiff., Darren Lee Courtney, Cincinnati, OH, pro se., A trial was held on March 6, 2018. The Plaintiff's expert witness involved in the investigation of the Debtor testified to three alleged schemes orchestrated by the Debtor to convert funds from Fujitec. However, the Plaintiff called no witness to lay the foundation for the admission of the documentary and computer-generated evidence relied upon by the expert witness in making his conclusions. The Plaintiff's only other witness, the president of Fujitec, similarly failed to lay the proper foundation for the documentary and computer-generated evidence. As such, the documentary and computer-generated evidence is deemed inadmissible. In turn, the expert's conclusions based solely upon inadmissible evidence are given no weight by this Court. Similarly, Fujitec's president lacked sufficient personal knowledge of the events to establish an underlying debt. For these reasons, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of establishing the Debtor's liability for a quantifiable debt. Judgment is therefore rendered in favor of the Defendant-Debtor, Darren Lee Courtney., In 1997, the Debtor was hired by Fujitec as a human resources manager but, eventually, became the company's Chief Legal Officer, which is the position he held until his termination in February of 2012. The Debtor testified that, from early on, it became apparent to the Debtor that his job would entail guiding Fujitec's top management to remain in compliance with American laws and rules of ethics with which top management was often unfamiliar. Over the years, he became responsible for overseeing Fujitec's legal issues and helping to settle the company's lawsuits., Both the Debtor and the Plaintiff agree that in 2011, the Debtor began settling fake or fabricated lawsuits purportedly on behalf of Fujitec. However, the parties offered conflicting testimony as to how the Debtor became involved in the scheme. The Debtor testified that he was asked to do so by Fujitec's President, Katsuji Okuda ("Mr. Okuda") for budget reasons. The Debtor explained that Fujitec maintained an "accrual" for settling claims and lawsuits. To the Debtor's understanding, it was important from a budget standpoint to keep the actual settlements below, but close to, the budgeted accrual number in order to prevent the accrual for settlements from being reduced in the following year's budget. Although he knew it to be wrong, the Debtor testified that he did not want to lose his job so he settled both legitimate and fabricated lawsuits at Mr. Okuda's request. According to the Debtor's testimony, the funds that came in for the settlement of these fabricated lawsuits were used to cover his legitimate business expenses for work performed on behalf of Fujitec so that Fujitec did not suffer a loss as a result of these activities., The Debtor testified that he did not want to be in a position of taking funds from Fujitec through these fabricated settlements. Consequently, he refused to continue settling the fabricated lawsuits when he no longer had a sufficient number of legitimate business expenses to which the funds could be applied. At that point, he wanted a release from liability so that he would not owe the company money for what he was being requested to do on behalf of Fujitec., On December 22, 2011, the Debtor sent Mr. Okuda an email discussing his continued efforts to limit costs by settling certain claims in-house without going through Travelers [Pl. Ex. 8]. The email included an attached letter from Travelers that Travelers wanted signed by the Debtor on behalf of Fujitec specifically waiving Fujitec's insurance coverage for one specific claim. A second document was attached to the email, which the Debtor stated "confirms my authority going forward to enter into settlements" and was designed to protect "both me and third parties, such as Travelers, who rely on my having such authority." [Id. ]. The document, titled an Authority Agreement and General Release ("Release") included language setting the general limits of the Debtor's settlement authority and further included a broad "General Release" provision stating:, Mr. Okuda further admitted to having signed the Release of the Debtor's liability on behalf of Fujitec but stated that he did not read or understand the Release. He testified that he often signs contracts on behalf of Fujitec that he does not read or understand and does not consider himself fluent in English. However, upon cross-examination by the Debtor, Mr. Okuda testified that, prior to being employed by Fujitec America, he was employed by Fujitec Canada for sixteen years. He further conceded that English is the primary language spoken at both Fujitec Canada and Fujitec America and that he does not often use an interpreter at work. Mr. Okuda testified that he has been speaking English at work with employees for a total of twenty-three years., With respect to his understanding of the Release, Mr. Okuda testified that he thought it was prepared by Travelers and necessary for the Debtor to take care of business and continue settling smaller lawsuits in house. While Mr. Okuda believed the Release was legitimate when signed, he testified that he no longer believed that to be true because of the Debtor's fabrications. Mr. Okuda testified that the Debtor's "thefts" were reimbursed by the Plaintiff in the amount necessary to cover both the losses caused by the Debtor's activities and the fees for the expert's investigation., The Debtor relinquished his license to practice law with disciplinary proceedings pending. Currently, the Debtor works part-time doing home remodeling for his own company, Vita Nova Properties and is not otherwise employed., Fujitec hired Mr. Todd Pleiman ("Mr. Pleiman"), a partner at RSM US LLP ("RSM") in March of 2012 to conduct a forensic accounting investigation (the "investigation") of alleged thefts by the Debtor while employed at Fujitec. Mr. Pleiman is a certified public accountant who has been employed by RSM for eleven years and is a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants. He has served on the University of Dayton Accounting Advisory Board and the Finance Committee of the Dayton Children's Hospital. He has conducted five or six similar forensic investigations of employee activities on behalf of other companies prior to investigating the Debtor. Mr. Pleiman testified that his role in the investigation was to review summary statements created by RSM employees, invoices and other information to ensure that the documents relied upon in the investigation supported the conclusions that his team at RSM were reaching., The investigation undertaken by Mr. Pleiman and his team at RSM led Mr. Pleiman to conclude that the Debtor engaged in three schemes to convert funds from Fujitec, which included: (i) the setup of fictitious law firms to make and settle fictitious lawsuits against Fujitec; (ii) the use of a company credit card for personal charges; and (iii) padding and forging expense reports for reimbursement of expenses that did not occur., With respect to the first scheme, Mr. Pleiman testified at trial that the Debtor set up three fictitious law firms as a way to funnel the settlement funds provided by Fujitec, under the guise of settling lawsuits, into Huntington National Bank and U.S. Bank accounts controlled by the Debtor. Mr. Pleiman formed his opinion based on checks, emails and other records he received from Fujitec, information gleaned from the computer provided by Fujitec that was purportedly used by the Debtor at work, bank statements received from Fujitec and/or the prosecutor, and internet searches of the law firms and case information found in these records. Mr. Pleiman opined that each of the law firms did not exist, except for on paper; Fujitec checks payable to each of the three fictitious law firms were deposited into bank accounts under the Debtor's control; and the bank accounts and signature cards linked to the fictitious law firms were traceable to the Debtor via the Debtor's computer. As a result of this scheme, Mr. Pleiman calculated that a total of $150,125 was fraudulently paid by Fujitec to the three law firms under the guise of settling fictitious claims., Second, Mr. Pleiman testified to the Debtor's alleged use of a Fujitec credit card for personal expenses. Mr. Pleiman's opinion was based on a summary prepared by RSM employees analyzing monthly credit card statements that RSM received from Fujitec. RSM differentiated between charges that appeared business-related versus those that were personal by attempting to match the statements to business expenses for which reimbursement requests were made. Mr. Pleiman testified that while the Debtor used the credit card for legitimate business expenses, he also used the card for personal charges. Mr. Pleiman concluded that the Debtor's personal expenses on the credit card totaled $29,170.74. Of that amount, the Debtor was reimbursed for $10,995.42 and an additional $18,175.32 in personal charges remained unpaid on the credit card., Third, Mr. Pleiman analyzed copies of expense reports, invoices and credit card statements provided by Fujitec to determine which of the Debtor's reimbursement requests were for legitimate business trips and expenses and which were for trips or expenses that did not occur. In making the determination, Mr. Pleiman compared the records to airline flight activity and sky miles records to see if the trips occurred., Mr. Pleiman also discussed hotel invoices that appeared to be created on the computer provided by Fujitec and allegedly used by the Debtor. From a review of these records, Mr. Pleiman concluded that the Debtor was reimbursed $17,386 for padded expenses., The other component of Plaintiff's alleged damages discussed at trial was the costs of the investigation of the Debtor. Mr. Pleiman testified that the investigation lasted a couple of months and that he and RSM charged just over $48,000 for it., Based on Mr. Pleiman's testimony, the total amount of damages to Fujitec for the Debtor's three fraudulent schemes plus the cost of the investigation equals $244,681.74. However, this amount does not match the $224,081.83 that Plaintiff's counsel asserts is the total nondischargeable debt., The business records reviewed and relied upon by Mr. Pleiman or other RSM employees to reach their conclusions include photo-copies of Fujitec checks, emails, bank account statements and signature cards, credit card statements for a Fujitec credit card allegedly used by the Debtor, expense reports, and invoices (together, the "Business Records") [Pl. Exs. 2-7]. In addition, Mr. Pleiman and other RSM employees relied upon information gleaned from the computer that the Debtor allegedly used while working at Fujitec, including allegedly doctored hotel receipts (the "Computer Records") [Id. ]. Furthermore, Exhibits 6 and 7 include summaries created by RSM employees to document the amount of the alleged conversion of funds by the Debtor as gleaned from the Business and Computer Records (the "Summary Evidence")., Mr. Pleiman testified that except for bank statements received from the prosecutor, the Business Records relied upon in the investigation were provided by various members of Fujitec's management. Mr. Pleiman stated that he believed the documents were authentic and accurate because they were approved by members of Fujitec management including, Ray Gibson, Fujitec's Chief Financial Officer, and Melissa Busch, the Controller. Neither Mr. Gibson nor Ms. Busch were called by the Plaintiff to testify. While Mr. Okuda, the President of Fujitec, testified that Fujitec provided the Business Records to Mr. Pleiman, he was not personally involved in the investigation., Throughout Mr. Pleiman and Mr. Okuda's testimony, the Debtor raised a continuing objection to the documentary evidence as hearsay, for lack of authentication, and for failure of the Plaintiff to lay the proper foundation for admission. While the Debtor did not object to Mr. Pleiman's qualifications as an expert, he asserted that Mr. Pleiman's conclusions were based on facts of which he had no personal knowledge and that he, instead, discerned from inadmissible evidence., Before determining whether the Plaintiff can meet its burden of proving the elements to except a debt from discharge, the Plaintiff must first show that a debt exists. Vande Ryt v. Peace (In re Peace) , 546 B.R. 65, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015) ; Weidle Corp. v. Leist (In re Leist), 398 B.R. 595, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) ("As elementary as it may seem, a creditor must establish that [the creditor] is owed a debt before it can be determined that the debt is nondischargeable under any § 523(a) exception to discharge."). "In many nondischargeability cases, a bankruptcy court is never tasked with making such a determination." Jennings v. Bodrick (In re Bodrick) , 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3752 at *11-12, 2017 WL 4877266, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2017). Where, for example, the debt is liquidated by judgment prior to the bankruptcy filing or the debtor does not dispute the amount or existence of the debt, then the bankruptcy court may only have to determine whether that debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a). Id. In this case, however, the Plaintiff holds no judgment against the Debtor and the Debtor disputes owing any debt to Fujitec or Plaintiff as its subrogee., At trial, the Plaintiff maintained that the Debtor employed three fraudulent schemes to pilfer money from Fujitec, those being, the settlement of fake lawsuits, the improper use of the company credit card and falsification of expense reports. The Plaintiff noted that the Debtor pleaded guilty to aggravated theft charges pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2913.02(A)(1) [Pl. Ex. 1]. This felonious conduct, the Plaintiff argued, is an admission against interest and forms the basis for liability, which damages the Plaintiff contends totals between $185,686.33 and $196,681.74., While the Debtor's guilty plea to felonious theft under Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02 is an admission that very well may establish wrongful conduct under one or more of the state law claims for relief in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff must also provide admissible evidence to establish the amount of damages suffered. For example, to establish the tort of conversion under Ohio law, which the Plaintiff appears to plead in the Amended Complaint, a plaintiff must demonstrate "that the plaintiff owned or had a right to possess the subject property at the time of the alleged conversion [and] that the defendant's alleged conversion was the result of a wrongful act or disposition of the plaintiff's property rights." CMEA Title Agency, Inc. v. Little (In re Little) , 335 B.R. 376, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a viable claim for conversion also requires a plaintiff to prove "damages ... that occurred as a result of the alleged conversion." Id. The Debtor's guilty plea under Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02(A)(1) to knowingly obtaining or exerting control over property with the purpose of depriving the owner of such property without the owner's consent arguably establishes the first two elements of conversion but does not establish quantifiable damages beyond the $5,000 in restitution the Debtor was ordered to pay. Such quantifiable damages are what the Plaintiff was required to prove at trial., In an effort to prove damages, the Plaintiff relied on documentary evidence in the form of the Business Records, Computer Records, and Summary Evidence, and the testimony of Mr. Pleiman and Mr. Okuda. For the reasons that follow, the Debtor's objections to the admissibility of the documentary evidence and the testimony of Mr. Pleiman and Mr. Okuda are sustained. The documentary evidence relied on by the Plaintiff to establish the facts is inadmissible hearsay. While Mr. Pleiman is a qualified expert, and his expert testimony is admissible, his conclusions as to the Debtor's liability are afforded no weight by this Court because the conclusions are not verifiable nor corroborated by any other witness's testimony or admissible documentary evidence. Mr. Okuda similarly failed to lay the proper foundation for the documentary evidence and lacked sufficient personal knowledge of the underlying events to establish the amount of damages. As such, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff did not carry its burden of establishing the existence of a debt., To establish the critical facts of the Debtor's alleged liability, Plaintiff proffered documentary records, cumulatively found in Plaintiff's Exhibits 2-7, as testified to by Mr. Pleiman and, to some extent, Mr. Okuda. The Debtor objected to the admissibility of the documentary evidence as hearsay and for failure to lay the proper foundation for authenticating the documents. Unfortunately, each of Plaintiff's exhibits contain multiple documents of varying types and Mr. Pleiman did not specifically testify as to each page or document within each exhibit making it difficult for this Court to sift through the documents for admissibility purposes. To aid in this process, this Court divides the documents in Plaintiff's Exhibits 2-7 based on categories relevant under the Rules of Evidence: Business Records, Computer Records and Summary Evidence., Most of the documents presented in Plaintiff's Exhibits 2-7 are documents generated by Fujitec, banks, or other businesses, which this Court will label for evidentiary purposes as the Plaintiff's Business Records. This Court agrees with the Debtor that the Business Records constitute statements, other than ones made by a declarant while testifying, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein and are thus, hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) - (c). See also Sicherman v. Diamoncut, Inc. (In re Sol Bergman Estate Jewelers, Inc.) , 225 B.R. 896, 900 (6th Cir. BAP 1998), aff'd , 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the Business Records may not be admitted into evidence unless qualified under an exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 802 ; Sol Bergman , 225 B.R. at 900. The Plaintiff, as the party offering the evidence, carries the burden of demonstrating that the evidence falls within a hearsay exception. Fifth Third Bancorp & Subsidiaries v. United States, 2008 WL 11351544, at *2 (S.D. Ohio March 28, 2008)., (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;